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Abstract 
This paper examines the controversies surrounding the adoption of the United Nations Global Compact 
on Migration (GCM) and their impacts for the European Union. On the one hand, the EU lost the 
momentum to speak with one voice in the final conference in Marrakech and at the UN General 
Assembly, as three Member States voted against the GCM and five abstained (one did not attend the 
conference). On the other hand, 19 EU Member States did sign the GCM. It shows a positive political 
commitment among these Member States to develop future policies at EU level. This paper offers an 
overview of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM, and in particular the EU’s commitment to creating 
“availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration” (objective 5). It argues that while some EU 
legal migration policies are generally in line with the GCM, some current EU Directives on labour 
immigration fall short of the standards laid down in the International Labour Organisation instruments 
and the principle of non-discrimination among different categories of workers (Carrera et al. 2019a). 
Moreover, EU irregular migration policies, such as the newly proposed recast EU Return directive, are 
incompatible with the GCM, for example in relation to objective 13 "using detention as a last resort 
measure" or objective 7 that also proposes to facilitate access for "non-removable" migrants "to an 
individual assessment that may lead to regular status”. The Paper concludes by opening up some 
questions for future assessments of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM. Will EU legislators use the 
GCM as an opportunity to develop a long-term and comprehensive strategy in the area of migration? 
Or will they continue searching for consensus among all Member States and subjecting the Union’s 
policies to 'intergovernmentalism' and the lowest common denominator?   
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Introduction  
On 10 December 2018 in Morocco, representatives of 164 participating states and the EU have 
attended the Intergovernmental Conference to approve the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration (known as the Global Compact for Migration – GCM) (European 
Commission 2019a). On 19 December 2018 the UN General Assembly has endorsed the GCM 
in the resolution 73/195. On this occasion, 152 countries, including 19 EU Member States, have 
voted in favour (UN General Assembly 2018). A number of controversies led three EU Member 
States to vote against the GCM (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), five more (Austria, 
Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania) to abstain and Slovakia did not attend this UN General 
Assembly meeting.  
This paper elaborates how the controversies surrounding the GCM have emerged and what 
impacts it had. The paper asserts that the decision of some EU Member States to leave the 
GCM, has weakened EU’s institutional position in the international arena and, in particular, the 
principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ in EU’s external action (Melin 2019; McAdam 2018). 
However, the fact that 19 EU Member States have signed the GCM, shows that, despite 
controversies, there is a political commitment to approve policies at EU level that aim at better 
facilitating rather than preventing migration, in line with the Qualitative Majority Vote at the 
Council (Carrera 2019; Crépeau 2018).  
Although at the moment EU has no formal role within the implementation and the follow-up 
of the GCM, in practice the EU and its agencies are already contributing to the achievement of 
many GCM objectives in the areas of development cooperation, non-discrimination and 
integration of Third Country Nationals, irregular migration and border controls, legal and labour 
migration policies, etc. (European Economic and Social Committee 2019; European 
Commission 2018). This paper offers a quick overview of the EU’s role in creating “availability 
and flexibility of pathways for regular migration” and ways in which the EU’s legal migration 
acquis is in line with and in which ways falling short of this GCM objective. Instead of 
conclusions, it leaves some questions open for further elaboration.  
1. The GCM as an unprecedented victory for multilateralism 
The origins of the Global Compact for Migration can be traced back to the UN Sustainable 
Development Agenda agreed in 2015 and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
agreed in 2016. The New York Declaration foresaw process on two separate Global Compacts 
to respond to “the growing global phenomenon of large movements of refugees and migrants” 
(UN General Assembly 2016: para. 2). The New York conference was convoked to search for 
international solutions in the context of large numbers of refugees and other migrants reaching 
the borders of Europe, often referred to as the ‘European humanitarian refugee crisis’ (Carrera 
2019; Carrera at al. 2019). With the New York Declaration, the UN has started negotiations 
towards concluding two separate compacts – one for refugees and another one for migrants.  
In December 2018 in Morocco, representatives of 152 countries, including 19 EU Member 
States, signed The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (known as the 
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Global Compact for Migration – GCM) (UN General Assembly 2018). The signing of the GCM 
has been celebrated by many academics and civil society as an “unprecedented victory of 
multilateralism” since it meant that, for the first time, a truly global framework for cooperation 
had been agreed in the area of migration (Donato and Ferris 2019) or the “beginning for the 
global regulation of migration” (McAdam 2018: 573). Although the GCM has not created new 
rights, nor it is a legally binding document, it has been considered as a political re-commitment 
to internationally agreed human rights and labour rights standards (Crépeau 2018; Gatti 2018; 
McAdam 2018; Peters 2018; Allison et al. 2019; Carrera 2019).  
In comparison with the Global Compact on Refugees, where there is an internationally agreed 
and binding legal framework, the Global Governance on Migration framework has been a 
“patchwork and weak” (Ferris and Donato 2019). While there have been earlier efforts to 
cooperate internationally on the issue of migration such as via Global Migration and 
Development Forums, via the Global Migration Group formed among the relevant agencies at 
the UN level, the international community has still to agree on what the phenomenon of 
migration entails and how it should be managed, in line with their earlier commitments under 
international human rights and international labour law – and even who should lead the 
process. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has taken the first steps towards preventing labour 
rights abuses and the severe exploitation of migrant workers, namely with the Migration for 
Employment Convention (Revised) No. 97 of 1949 and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) Convention No. 143 of 1975. The ILO has also been leading the process of drafting 
the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their 
Family Members (ICRMW) (UN General Assembly 1990). It constituted a first attempt to create 
a legally binding instrument in the area of international migration that has “extended well 
beyond prior conventions” and for the first time articulated a set of human rights applicable to 
all migrants (Donato and Ferris 2019: 55). In addition, the ICRMW was coupled with an 
oversight mechanism – the Committee on Migrant Workers. Even such a robust international 
framework has failed to create international consensus: while countries of origin have 
welcomed and ratified the ICRMW, the countries of destination see it as too ambitious, and 
refrained from signing and/or ratifying it.  
One of the most ambitious elements of the ICRMW has been the commitment to ensure the 
rights of migrant workers equivalent to those of national workers, “without discrimination on 
the migration status”, meaning that also rights of undocumented migrant workers would need 
to be respected. Although similar principles can be traced back to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the EU Treaties, and the status of worker prevails over the status of 
non-national and therefore all workers should be granted equivalent protection of their labour 
rights (Carrera et al. 2019a), the ICRMW remains ignored by all the current EU Member States 
and the major countries of destination. To date, the ICRMW is the least ratified among the nine 
main UN International Covenants and thus it was not even quoted within the GCM.  
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In contrast, the drafting of the GCR has been rooted in the well-developed international 
framework where all current EU Member States had readily accepted obligations under 
international humanitarian law, including the 1951 Geneva Convention and its protocols. It was 
also guided by the already established role of the UNHCR that is also supposed to be the key 
‘catalyst’ for implementation (Carrera and Cortinovis 2019a; Ferris and Donato 2019).  
In the area of migration, some forms of international cooperation were ongoing through 
various consultative forums, like the Global Migration and Development Forum (GMDF) or 
cooperation facilitated through the network of the 21 UN bodies working on migration – Global 
Migration Group (GMG) (Ferris and Donato 2019). However, there was still no globally agreed 
approach on migration, and therefore the GCM is an important victory for multilateralism in 
this sensitive policy area. The GCM establishes an unprecedented global “cooperative 
framework” on migration that “upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under 
international law” (GCM, Preamble 7). 
This context can partly explain why the GCM started as a state-led process, where Switzerland 
and Mexico were in the driving seat during negotiations. Nevertheless, it was foreseen that the 
IOM would be the ‘catalyst’ for implementation of the GCM and in particular in its International 
Migration Review Forum. The artificial divisions between the GCR and GCM have been noted 
by some authors, and also as an opportunity to resolve the division of work between the UNHCR 
on the one hand and the IOM on the other (Ferris and Donato 2019; Allison et al. 2019).  
The GCM text has been seen as ‘ambitious’; however, at the same time, it was not intended to 
be a legally binding document (Allison et al. 2019; Carrera et al. 2018a; Gatti 2018; Peters 2018). 
Nevertheless, the GCM has proved an important step in the area of Global Migration 
Governance ‘the GCM for the first time set out a comprehensive framework for migration’ 
(Ferris and Donato 2019:119). Such international cooperation on migration needs to be based 
on a “common understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose regarding 
migration, making it work for all” (GCM, Preamble 9). Thus, the GCM proposes a new normative 
approach and narrative on migration. The GCM stresses that national borders should be 
managed in line with international humanitarian and human rights law. It underlines that 
human rights are “the precondition for the deliberative politics and for legitimation of the rule-
of-law-based power” (Carrera et al. 2018a: 8). The GCM also elucidates interdependencies 
between countries of origin, transit and destination and highlights that a common approach is 
needed, as “no State can address the phenomenon alone”.  
The GCM comprehensive framework is: “comprised of 23 objectives, implementation as well 
as follow-up and review. Each of objectives contains a commitment, followed by a range of 
actions, considered to be relevant policy instruments and best practices” (GCM para. 16). 
Indeed, the text of the GCM does not prescribe or oblige countries to take certain actions, but 
rather invites them “to draw” from these commitments. These objectives vary from a collection 
of accurate and desegregated data (objective 1), promoting evidence-based discourse on 
migration (17), to saving lives (objective 8) or recognising migrants’ skills, qualifications and 
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competences (objective 18), to managing borders (objective11) or facilitating return operations 
and reintegration (21) in line with already existing human rights standards.  
The GCM does not constitute a legally binding agreement and has been criticised on this point 
by a number of civil society organisations (Ferris and Donato 2019; Allison et al. 2019). 
However, in light of the lessons of the ICRMW, and subsequent reactions among some 
governments even to non-binding instruments, it seems that there would have been very little 
buy-in among the UN States Parties if the GCM had been a binding document. The ReSOMA 
Ask the Expert interviews revealed that “the non-binding nature of the Compact seems to be 
one the most important obstacles to its further implementation in practice” (Lesinska 2019b).  
Although, the GCM was designed as a politically but not legally binding instrument (Malin 
2019), the disinformation campaign across the EU has created a controversy about whether 
the document creates new legal obligations for the governments signing it and, in particular, 
the ‘right to migration’ (Carrera et al. 2018a). The document was based on pre-existing 
international human rights standards that are applicable in the area of migration, so it was seen 
as rather re-commitment to those standards (Allison et al. 2019; Crépeau 2018; Ferris and 
Donato 2019; Carrera et al. 2018a; Carrera and Cortinovis 2019a; Gatti 2018; Lesinska 2019a; 
Peters 2018).  
While it does not create new rights, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Migrants’ Rights, 
Francois Crépeau, saw a potential in the GCM to develop “from a normative framework to a 
binding document” as occurred with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the UN level, 
or with the Fundamental Rights Charter within the EU (Lesinska 2019b). It could potentially take 
decades for this to happen.  
Among some of the key innovations, the GCM has reinstated the principle of a ‘firewall’ in its 
objective 15 to provide access to basic services to all migrants. In addition, although watered 
down, there is a provision calling for regularisation of ‘non-removable’ migrants. The objective 
7 on “addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration” calls on governments (GCM, para. 
23 (i)) “to build on existing practices to facilitate access for migrants in an irregular status to an 
individual assessment that may lead to regular status.” Also a number of principles have been 
reiterated, such as the “best interest of the child” or “detention as a last resort”. 
2. The vote at the UN General Assembly:  
divisions among and within EU Member States  
Among the 19 signatory EU Member States, the majority signed the Compact without any 
remarks. Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Malta, and the UK highlighted in their 
explanatory memorandums the non-binding legal nature of the GCM (Melin 2019; Carrera et 
al. 2018a). Only five countries around the globe voted against the final text of the GCM, namely 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and two countries whose state-building was based on 
migration – the United States and Israel.  
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Figure 1. Comparison of the vote of the EU Member States and EEA/ Schengen zone countries 
(inner circle) and the rest of the UN States Parties (outside circle)  
 
Source: Author, 2019 on the basis of the UN official data.  
Only 12 countries around the globe abstained, including five EU Member States: Austria, 
Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Romania. The remaining seven were: 2 European Economic Area 
countries – Switzerland and Lichtenstein; 2 from North Africa (Algeria and Libya); 1 in Asia – 
Singapore; 1 in Latin America – Chile, and also a traditional migration country – Australia.  
A further 24 countries did not attend the vote at the UN General Assembly, including one EU 
Member State – Slovakia. Differently from the ICRMW, while the old divisions between the 
global North and global South were on display at the UN General Assembly, eight of the total 
24 countries that did not vote or did not show up at the meeting were in the UN list of the least 
developed countries in the world, namely Afghanistan, Benin, Guinea, Kiribati, Sao 
Tome/Principe, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu. The rest were either small island nations with 
high income or low/middle income countries.  
If abstentions in Figure 1 are ignored, the EU appears as a quite divided region in comparison 
with the rest of the UN States Parties (see Figure 1 above). This can also be explained by the 
multiple divides among and within the EU Member States – normative, partisan/ inter-
ministerial and inter-generational (Crépeau 2018; Carrera et al. 2018a; Melin 2019; Allison et 
al. 2019; Huddleston and Sarif 2019). 
The vote in Marrakech also showcased the normative clash between EU Member States seeing 
migration as a ‘threat’ or ‘danger’ and those seeing migration and mobility as an ‘opportunity’ 
for innovation, economic growth, for demographic change, for development (Crépeau 2018; 
McAdam 2018; Carrera et al. 2018a; Huddleston and Sarif 2019). The withdrawals from the 
GCM negotiations made opposition within the Member States more visible, between 
ministries/or functions falling under leadership of different parties and also between the 
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Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Interior, as occurred in Austria, Belgium, Slovakia, 
Italy and Germany (Carrera et al. 2018a; Melin 2019; Gatti 2018).  
In addition, there is also a generational issue. For example, Crépeau (2018:650) argues that:  
“ageing baby boomers [in the global North] perceive migration as a threat to their 
accumulated nest egg and fail to understand that diversity and mobility are already 
part of the future of their societies”. 
The following paragraph shows how the above-mentioned divisions within society have been 
exploited and artificially manipulated in the final months before the Marrakech conference.  
The final text of GCM was already agreed in July 2018 after a two-year process where Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and also the EU Delegation to the UN had been carefully ensuring that the 
text was in line with national and EU priorities. However, in the run-up to adoption, the GCM 
became a subject of various controversies, including of the disinformation campaign “led by 
right-wing populists and right-wing extremists” (Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2019a):  
“While the agreement was barely talked about on social media until mid-
September, far-right and right-wing populist influencers discovered the issue in 
mid-September and began spreading large-scale distorted interpretations and 
misinformation about the U.N. migration pact [GCM].”  
The controversy was created by producing tweets, posts on YouTube and Facebook, that 
distorted the content of the GCM (Cerulus and Schaart 2019). For example, the key messages 
aimed to convince audiences that the GCM creates ‘a right to migrate’, and thus countries 
would lose control over their borders and their sovereignty would be challenged. Many of these 
messages were coupled with racial and xenophobic slurs and conspiracy theories promoting 
anti-migration attitudes. The researchers found that “right-wing populists and conspiracy 
theorists” were responsible for about half of the most popular YouTube videos about the GCM 
(Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2019a; Cerulus and Schaart 2019). The research confirmed that 
the Austrian far-right had been in the driving seat of this campaign of ‘trolling the GCM’ 
(Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2019a; Cerulus and Schaart 2019). 
The vote at the UN General Assembly indeed culminated in some of the EU governments 
leaving the GCM, while most of the myths and “contradictions in terms” could have been 
dispelled by simply reading the text of the GCM (Carrera et al. 2018a). The Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue (ISD) thus concluded that “right-wing extremist and right-wing populist actors played 
a disproportionate role” in why EU Member States left the GCM. These developments should 
be assessed relative to the actual context where a majority of people are positive about 
migration. A ReSOMA brief on public opinion concluded that despite various disinformation 
campaigns “public opinion remains relatively positive, stable and hard-to-change in most parts 
of Europe, even among people who lived near EU hotspots, refugee routes and reception 
centres” (Huddleston and Sarif 2019: 20). 
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The controversy created around GCM is yet another example of the manipulation of public 
opinion to impact outcomes of democratic processes (Bayer et al. 2019). For example, similar 
disinformation campaigns using distorted images of ‘surge’, ‘invasion’ and other xenophobic 
messages were also employed in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in Spain, 
Germany, Austria, Italy, France, aiming to generate or to exploit existing divisions within society 
(Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2019b). This further calls into question the role of 
disinformation and propaganda on the very functioning of Rule of Law, democracy and 
fundamental rights, that is outside the scope of this paper (Bayer et al. 2019). 
In this case, the unity of the EU’s voice in its external action has been challenged and in 
particular the principle of sincere cooperation (Melin 2019). The first to contradict the EU’s 
position was the right-wing government of Hungary led by Viktor Orbán, in March, 2018. This 
came as no surprise, given its anti-migration rhetoric, non-compliance with the EU principles 
of equal solidarity and failure to respect the EU’s founding values (Carrera et al. 2018a; Carrera 
2019; Melin 2019).  
The domino effect started with Austria declaring it would leave the Compact in October, 2018, 
despite at that time also holding the Presidency of the EU and previously having led the EU’s 
agenda on signing the GCM. As mentioned above, Austrian far-right activists and ‘political 
influencers’ were very effective in manipulating public opinion on the GCM. It enabled the 
openly anti-migration Austrian chancellor Sebastian Kurz to withdraw from the GCM (Institute 
for Strategic Dialogue 2019a; in Cerulus and Schaart 2019). By November 2018, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland had followed, while also Italy, Germany and even 
Switzerland started to hesitate openly whether to sign the GCM (Melin 2019).  
The case of Switzerland remains particularly illustrative, as Switzerland together with Mexico 
had been leading the GCM negotiations (Carrera et al. 2018a; Gatti 2018; Melin 2019). The 
Swiss President Alain Berset “gave the pact his personal blessing” and so did the Swiss Federal 
Council agreeing that the GCM “guiding principles and objectives correspond fully with 
Switzerland’s policy on migration” (Bradley 2018). However, from October onwards, opposition 
built up and, “against mounting resistance from politicians from centre and right-wing parties 
in Switzerland, the executive body was reluctant to throw its full support behind the deal” 
(Bradley 2018). The Swiss Ministry of Foreign affairs decided to consult its parliament on the 
document, and this led to the abstention of Switzerland in Marrakech. Eventually, the Swiss 
Parliament approved the GCM. In Italy, Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini also called for 
parliamentary consultation as a strategy to block the ratification of the GCM (Cerulus and 
Schaart 2019).  
A similar controversy arose in Slovakia, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Lajcak, 
who was at that time also acting as President of the UN General Assembly, had strongly 
supported the GCM (Melin 2019). However, the opposition submitted the GCM, a non-binding 
document, for parliamentary backing, which was not granted and thus the Slovak 
Representation decided not to attend the vote at the UN General Assembly.  
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From being the solution to the situation of ‘crisis’, this disinformation campaign managed, in 
some EU Member States, to reframe the GCM as yet another issue of contention. Even the 
internal legal note from the European Commission’s legal service, explaining the duties arising 
from the EU Treaties, namely the EU’s principle of loyal and sincere cooperation in 
development cooperation in international forums (European Commission 2019a), itself 
became a subject for the subsequent disinformation campaign. The European Commission in 
this instance was shown as going against the sovereign right of its Member States to decide 
how they frame and deal with the issue of migration (FactCheckEU 2019).  
Academics note, that precisely, the globally agreed normative understanding of migration as 
not solely a challenge, but also as an opportunity has led some governments, and, in particular, 
the Ministries of Interior to rebel (Crépeau 2018; Carrera et al. 2018a; Gatti 2018). Objective 
17 of the GCM, which called for fighting xenophobia and promoting evidence-based discourse 
on migration, aimed to counter the strategies where politicians have built their political capital 
on anti-migrant sentiments. It is thus precisely such politicians and movements that aimed to 
sabotage the GCM process. The far-right parties and populist politicians have based their 
arguments against the GCM on account of it opening the doors for irregular migration. 
Academia has asserted, that by refusing to cooperate internationally, such politicians were in 
fact, conversely ‘calling for more irregular, unsafe and unregulated migration’ (Carrera et al. 
2018a).  
3. GCM vote as a lost opportunity for ‘unified EU’s approach’ in the 
international arena  
The EU Delegation in the New York has been an active negotiator since 2016, with and on behalf 
of EU Member States as it coordinated “statements through the EU delegations in the 
consultative and stocktaking phase” (European Commission 2018:1). The European 
Commission initially planned to sign the GCM on behalf of the Union and thus requested the 
Council give such authorisations in the area of legal migration (under Article 79 of TEU) and in 
the area of development cooperation (under Article 209 of the TEU (European Commission 
2018b; Melin 2019). The Commission has reiterated, that the GCM is furthering the EU’s 
commitments towards achieving the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) that have been endorsed by the Council of the EU in the New Consensus on 
Development Cooperation (European Commission 2018 and 2019a).  
The Commission argued that the latter consensus also constituted a unified EU approach to 
signing the GCM. The legal analysis (Melin 2019) showed that the preceding documents, while 
indicating the support for the GCM, lacked sufficient precision as to what the Union position 
was to constitute a basis on which the Commission could negotiate. This analysis revealed that 
for non-binding documents, the EU actually has no precise procedure that needs to be 
followed, namely, whether the Commission needs authorisation from the Council and at which 
stage of the procedure. 
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In its explanatory memorandum, the Commission has argued that implementation of the GCM 
is closely linked with the SDGs that EU is promoting externally and thus falls within the 
competence of development cooperation policy under Article 208 TFEU. The explanatory 
memorandum quoted three legal bases for the Council to approve the Commission’s proposed 
decisions, based on Article 16 TEU (on Foreign Affairs Council that “shall elaborate the Union's 
external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and 
ensure that the Union's action is consistent”) in conjunction with Articles 79 and 209 TFEU. The 
above-mentioned controversies led to the Council of the EU ignoring the Commission’s request 
for authorisation to approve the GCM outcome on behalf of the EU. Later in 2019, the 
Commission withdrew this proposal (European Commission 2019b).  
An internal legal note has highlighted, that the principle of sincere cooperation in external 
action entails “duties of action and abstention”. Article 210 TFEU further elaborates a meaning 
of sincere cooperation “for the specific purpose of development cooperation” calling for a 
common position at international forums when matters are related to international 
development cooperation. This principle becomes important for several reasons. First, the EU 
as a legal entity could not negotiate its positions on the GCM, since it is not a UN State Party, 
and was only invited with observer status. Second, under the EU’s legal framework, various 
aspects of the GCM fall within ‘parallel competences’ where the EU and Member States could 
have different opinions, i.e. on employment, social coordination and others to ‘exclusive 
competences’ of the EU, such as for example EU Return Policies or Legal Migration directives, 
where the Member States could not depart from their commitments under EU law. The 
Commission has argued, that because GCM encompassed such a wide array of issues falling 
within exclusive EU competence, EU-level coordination was needed (European Commission 
2019, paras. 48-9).  
The outcome of three EU Member States contradicting the official position, and five more 
abstaining, not only violated the ‘principle of unity in the international representation of the 
Union’, but also weakened the EU’s negotiating power and credibility in the international arena 
in the field of migration and, possibly, beyond (European Commission 2019a). The European 
Commission (2018) highlighted this in its proposal for a Council decision to authorise the 
Commission to approve the final draft of the GCM on behalf of the Union, as it:  
“largely reflects EU acquis and policy, and reflects the Union's objective to promote 
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the 
United Nations.” 
If this is the case, the import of nine Member States contradicting the EU position, is deeper 
than simply the issue of “unity of EU representation”. It means that EU Member States voting 
against and abstaining from the GCM are signalling their departure not only from 
internationally agreed human rights and international labour standards, but also from their 
commitments to EU legal principles, such as non-discrimination, equal solidarity, loyal and 
sincere cooperation, and respect of fundamental rights.  
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4. GCM vote as a possibility for EU to build a comprehensive and long-term 
strategy on migration  
Despite the lack of unanimity discussed above, the GCM vote gives a new impetus to people-
centred and human rights-based EU policymaking in the area of migration. If the GCM votes 
reflect the genuine positions of the19 EU Member States, then there is one more reason to 
celebrate the GCM as a victory – if a qualified majority vote, and not unanimous consensus 
keeps being applied in EU-level decision-making. Figure 2 below converts EU Member States 
votes in the UN General Assembly on resolution 73/195 into a calculation of a qualified majority 
vote in the Council in the EU.  
In this way, GCM has presents EU and its Member States a venue to create a long-term and 
comprehensive EU migration strategy that is in line with international human rights law, 
humanitarian law and labour law obligations and responsive to the global realities, because ‘no 
country’ and most likely, no region alone can deal with migration challenges and opportunities.  
The European Commission (2018), in its draft proposal for the Council of the EU authorising 
approval of the GCM “in the field of development cooperation” made an overstatement, at 
best, that EU already has created such strategy:  
 
“Over the past years, the Union has built a comprehensive long-term strategy on 
migration covering all aspects of this phenomenon, from saving lives, offering 
protection to those in need, addressing the root causes of irregular migration and 
forced displacement as well as providing support to forcibly displaced populations 
around the world. This strategy is built on partnership and close cooperation with 
partner countries and organisations such as the African Union, the United Nations 
and its Agencies. This comprehensive approach should be promoted globally.” 
 
Indeed, in the area of migration there have been major developments taking place since the 
1999 Tampere Conclusions. The EU has gained competences in various migration-related areas 
– from developing legal migration acquis, the Schengen Borders Code, Visa Code, and the 
Common European Asylum System. Despite this, academia argues that EU is still far away from 
having a ‘long-term strategy’, when we speak about migration (Crépeau 2018; Carrera 2019; 
Carrera et al. 2019a; Allison et al. 2019). For example, Crépeau (2018: 651) highlights that, 
unlike in the other areas, strategic planning in the area of migration management is lacking: 
“The timeline of these policies always seems to be now – ‘stopping migration now’, ‘sending 
back migrants now’, ‘bringing IT technicians now’.”  
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Figure 2. The outcome of the GCM in light of the qualified majority vote rule at the Council*  
 
Notes: *Slovakia not attending the conference counts as ‘abstaining’.  
Source: EU QMV calculator on the basis of UN official data 2019.  
One of the key goals of the GCM is to facilitate “safe, orderly and regular migration”. In 
particular, the GCM’s Objective 5 has called on countries around the globe “To enhance 
availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration”. Progress in EU policymaking in the 
area of legal migration since the so-called European Humanitarian Refugee Crisis has been very 
limited (Carrera 2019; Carrera et al. 2019a). For example, Member States at the Council of the 
EU have blocked a much-needed revision of the EU Blue Card that aimed at improving the EU’s 
attractiveness for highly skilled third-country nationals, as well as simplifying some 
administrative procedures, and making entry and intra-EU mobility easier for this category of 
workers (Carrera et al. 2019a). Previous research found that as of 2016, out of all Blue Card 
applications, only 2.2% were issued to nationals of sub-Saharan Africa. Once again, this shows 
that the cumulative effects of EU Visa policies, bi-lateral agreements, and qualification 
recognition procedures still make regular migration into the EU very challenging, even for the 
highly qualified and/or highly skilled. 
Even more shortcomings have been identified in the EU legal migration acquis aimed at middle 
and low-skilled migration. For example, the Seasonal Workers Directive prescribes that the 
working and living conditions of seasonal workers may fall short of international human rights 
and labour rights standards. Seasonal workers, depending on the transposition by the Member 
State, currently have only one opportunity to change employer or sector. However, the barriers 
in practice, and the risk of falling into irregularity makes it virtually impossible for the majority 
of seasonal workers to use the possibility provided in law. Also, seasonal workers have no right 
to bring their family members into the EU, which now stands in contrast with GCM paragraph 
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21(i) where States Parties agreed to “facilitate access to procedures for family reunification for 
migrants at all skills levels”. 
In addition, a number of third-country nationals are not covered by any of the ‘first entry’ 
directives and in particular in those sectors where predominantly undocumented or undeclared 
migrant workers are being exploited. For example, there are no schemes at EU level to admit 
migrant domestic or other care workers, thus they sometimes find themselves in situations of 
labour exploitation, forced labour and servitude. A previous study has called for a binding 
immigration code that is horizontally applicable to all categories of third-country nationals 
(Carrera el al. 2019 a). While the GCM calls for new pathways, some academics considered as 
a shortcoming that it does not explicitly mention the responsibilities of these sectors. For 
example, Francois Crépeau (2018) saw this as a “blind spot left in the GCM”:  
 “[the GCM] does not mention that destination countries must reduce their 
underground labour markets, which acts as a major pull factor for undocumented 
migration” and that it has led to “delocalization of labour conditions from the global 
South to the global North” in the sectors that could not be delocalized, such as 
“agriculture, care, construction, extraction, fisheries and hospitality.” 
In addition, there is a lack of legal pathways for those escaping war and violence. The 
policymaking in the area of the Common European Asylum System has experienced even 
deeper ‘policy paralysis’ – the insistence on a consensus as opposed to QMV has made it 
impossible to move ahead with the asylum package. Also, the proposal on humanitarian visas, 
that could be seen as one of the ways to contribute to the objective 5, is currently pending.  
Several other EU policies enacted in ‘crisis mode’ stand at odds with the objectives of the GCM, 
such as ‘ad hoc disembarkation arrangements’ with objective 8 “to save lives and establish 
coordinated international efforts on missing migrants”, or the currently proposed Returns 
Recast directive with objective 13 “to use migration detention only as a measure of last resort” 
(Vosyliūtė 2019). Thus, the question arises how the tensions between the GCM objectives 
undertaken by 19 EU Member States and ongoing or newly undertaken EU-level legislation, 
policies and operational responses can be resolved.  
Conclusion: What impacts of the GCM in EU policymaking in the area of 
migration and borders? 
Twenty years after the Tampere Council, the EU has developed an exclusive competence on 
multiple migration management related issues, including the legal migration directives, border 
control procedures, various tools aiming at addressing irregular migration, including anti-
migrant smuggling, returns, etc. Even when the EU does not have an exclusive competence, EU 
institutions and agencies are increasingly becoming involved in various internal and external 
migration-management policies and practices that are covered by the objectives of the GCM, 
from search and rescue to screening and vulnerability assessment procedures at hotspots, the 
role of civil society (Carrera and Cortinovis 2019a and 2019b; Carrera et al. 2019b, 2018b and 
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2018c). In addition, the EU has been providing forums and funding to enable EU Member State 
cooperation with third countries as to address the ‘root causes’ – such as via International 
Development Aid (IDA) instruments, International Partnership Agreements (IPAs) with EU 
neighbourhood countries and increasingly via extra-EU budget instruments such as the Trust 
Fund for Africa (Carrera et al. 2018d).  
The EU delegation has been actively calling for a global solution for the refugee and migration 
crisis. Thus, following the New York Declaration in 2016, it has actively participated in 
consultations to ensure that the drafting of the GCM reflects EU policies and priorities. The 
European Commission (2018) claimed that the final draft of the GCM of July 2018 was in line 
with EU objectives, as did 27 EU Member States (with exception of Hungary that had already 
left the process in March).  
The EU has not found one voice to speak at the UN level, with three EU Member States, namely 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, voting against and five more abstaining, and Slovakia 
not attending the conference at all. On the one hand, the controversy around the GCM has 
showed how democratic processes can be exploited by small interest groups, thwarting a 
‘unified EU approach’. On the other hand, the fact that 19 EU Member States have politically 
re-committed to their obligations under international human rights, humanitarian and labour 
law presents an opportunity for creating ‘a comprehensive long-term strategy on migration’ 
(European Commission 2018), but only if qualified majority voting is being actively used in the 
Council.  
In the final months before the Marrakech summit, so-called populists and far-right activists 
managed to create panic around the GCM by manipulating public opinion and exploiting pre-
existing divisions in society along party lines and generational divides (Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue 2019a; Huddleston and Sarif 2019). The controversy also fuelled ‘right’ vs ‘left’ party 
politics at national level, and in particular, reflected the diverging objectives between the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Interior, that have led certain Ministers to depart 
– in Belgium it was the Minister of Interior who had to leave, while in Slovakia – the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was threatening to resign. The EU Delegation to the UN and a number of 
academics have warned, essentially, that this controversy has weakened the EU’s role on 
migration internationally (European Commission 2019a; Carrera et al. 2018a; Gatti 2018; Melin 
2019; Ferris and Donato 2019; Allison et al. 2019). 
In total, 152 countries signed the GCM, highlighting the global consensus that ‘no state’ alone 
can deal with the phenomenon, that there is a common understanding on migration and that 
a global cooperation framework is needed. It has now to be implemented both internally within 
the majority of EU Member States and externally – with majority of the EU’s global partners. 
The divisions within the EU raise several questions to be answered by the new EU legislature 
on defining what will be the EU’s role in implementing the GCM:  
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• Will the EU use GCM as an opportunity come up with a long-term and comprehensive 
strategy in the area of migration? Or will the EU continue to search for consensus, 
subjecting its policies to a lowest common denominator?  
• Which Directorates-General in the Commission, EU agencies and supervisory authorities 
could play a role in the implementation and oversight of Member States implementing 
the GCM?  
• How can the EU leverage is multi-stakeholder forums, policy tools and funding to 
promote the objectives of the GCM?  
• What should be the role of EU justice and home affairs agencies that are ‘supporting the 
Member States’? What should be done when some Member States are engaging in 
practices that depart from the GCM and the EU’s legal framework? 
• And finally, how could EU-level institutions and agencies be held accountable for 
implementing the GCM? 
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